History and the making and remaking of Wales
In 1907 Mr L. J. Roberts, a government education inspector, claimed:
There are special reasons why Welsh children should learn the history of Wales. Welshmen in the past have felt ashamed that they were a conquered nation but a knowledge of history teaches them that the prolonged resistance for many hundreds of years of their small country, abutting as it does for its whole length on England, is one of the most remarkable stories in history. It is a duty to give children a sympathetic knowledge of their environment. 1 In contrast, nearly a century later, Sir Glanmor Williams, one of the founding fathers of academic Welsh history, wrote in his autobiography:
The justification for Welsh history was not that it bolstered patriotism or national consciousness. It was the sober historical fact that the Welsh had a history of their own which, despite its close links with that of other British peoples, was in marked respects different. It could not be understood as a regional fag end of the history of England.
2 Yet why Welsh history was different, and why there was a national consciousness at all in Wales, owed much to the fact that history -both in the sense of the past itself and representations of that past -has been employed over the centuries to assert Welsh identity, just as Mr Roberts wanted. In other words, the repeated and sustained use of history had incrementally made Wales different and thus shaped events that followed. Indeed, with nothing resembling a nation state until 1999, and a culture and economy that was intricately linked to and overshadowed by England, the past could often seem to be the only justification for the existence of a Welsh nation. As the poet R. S. Thomas wrote in 1955, 'There is no present in Wales, And no future; There is only the past'. 3 There was nothing particularly unusual about such a use of history. During the nineteenth century, the past was the 'raison d'être of nationalism ' . 4 It offered a powerful sense of justification for national unification in Italy and Germany, by connecting people divided by political borders through pointing to a common cultural heritage. History was also utilised in existing states. In Britain, it helped justify the empire; in the USA it gave people a sense of national destiny. 5 Inevitably, there was a great deal of selective reading in how the past was employed and traditions were invented where suitably malleable ones did not exist. But, whatever its fictions, history became a defining constituent of nationalism. 6 In late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Wales, romantics searched the past to find things they could use for their own purposes of sustaining Wales. The
Celts and druids were employed to build a picture of the Welsh as a mysterious and poetic people, the true ancient Britons. This involved the collection, publication or even creation of legends and folktales. Iolo Morgannwg went as far as forging documents about Welsh-speaking Indians to claim a Welsh prince had discovered America in the twelfth century. This revival in Welsh history may have often been little more than wishful thinking but it did feed into a more general Welsh identity.
Yet, by the late Victorian period, romanticism seemed out of place in an era of modernity, and history was rewritten to stress the devoutness and cultural achievements of the Welsh. 7 As the mock-medieval investiture of the future Edward VIII as Prince of Wales at Caernarfon Castle in 1911 showed, even the symbols of conquest were recast to declare Wales as a partner rather than a subject of England.
E. Lloyd's A History from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest (1911) -was
a conscious part of and attempt to influence the 'rebirth' of the Welsh nation. 9 What people in nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century Wales knew about their collective past was a different matter. Matthew Arnold, a Victorian professor of poetry at Oxford, claimed that everywhere in Wales had its own traditions and that the Welsh people knew and clung to this living past. 10 That attachment seemed to have been based on oral traditions of family and community but, as the twentieth century progressed, the potential for a collective Welsh national memory developed with the growth of education, museums and depictions of the past in popular culture. This collective memory was neither static nor based on any straightforward factual base.
Nor did it create a straightforward sense of national awareness. This new industrial heritage was not without its critics. In both Wales and the wider UK, there were concerns that it marked a culture preoccupied with looking back rather than forward, that the history presented was misleading and that too much economic hope was being placed in the heritage centres. There were also concerns that much of the heritage sector was presenting bogus history. 50 In particular, there were concerns that industrial heritage was sanitized, with the dirt and danger of work and the grinding poverty of its associated communities glossed over. 51 Contemporaries often had a rather hazy idea of what the Great War was about and the sense that it was little to do with ordinary people was certainly not unknown but to voice this in terms of Wales thinking of it as an English rather than British war is not something substantive historical evidence exists for. Similarly, the Rebecca riots and tithe wars were primarily economic rather than national disturbances. History in schools were not helping correct or balance such perspectives and two educational commentators thus argued, 'as far as pupils in both England and Wales are concerned, the only meaningful relationship that Welsh and English people had was based around war and conquest.' 60 There is a danger that encouraging people to see the past in terms of national rivalries alone can make them to see the present in such terms too.
The tendency to read a nationalistic perspective into conflicts that were about quite different things is most obvious in the celebrations of Owain Glyndŵr. He, at least, did claim to have a nationalist cause but it was a mask that ennobled more material grievances. 61 Nonetheless, Glyndŵr was clearly a national hero, and one whose popularity went beyond politicized nationalists. Hard-headed historians see it in a different light, disparage its motives, deplore its effects, and present it as just another regional disruption in a period of distress and disaffection all over Europe. They are too late, though. Legend is far stronger than academic analysis, and Owain was long ago transmuted into a figure of myth. We see him to this day larger than life, the very image of the Welsh identity, slaughtering the English on bloody battlefields ... we see him followed to the end by the mass of the Welsh people, united in loyalty, triumphant in their own ways, refulgent, far back there in popular memory amidst their own music, poetry and holiness.
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At the end of the twentieth century, school lessons about his revolt often did little to refute this picture by teaching it in isolation from the wider events in Britain and
France that it was entwined with.
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Glyndŵr's romance was added to by the fact that he was never captured and a legend was thus able to grow that one day he would return to save Wales. When at the end of the 1970s a group of arsonists began burning down the holiday homes of English people in rural Wales, they christened themselves Meibion Glyndŵr (the sons of Glyndŵr). He may never have been captured but Glyndŵr was defeated. While
Welsh medieval history was easily used to create a sense of oppression, it was more problematic using it to build a sense of pride because ultimately it was a story of Such debates were not just abstract ideas; they had real political and cultural consequences. Some felt that the history of conquest lay behind a widely-perceived sense of inferiority in Wales.
It also generated what some termed postcolonial art, drama, literature and scholarship, cultural outputs that consciously tried to mark a reawakening of a once-suppressed culture. 69 The reach of such writings and performances was relatively limited in a nation more interested in soap operas and sport than politicized plays and poetry. However, the ideas they embodied had a that. We got a good history -we got a good culture'. 73 The root of such beliefs was the Welsh Not, a board placed around children's neck in the nineteenth century if they were heard speaking Welsh at school with the child wearing it at the end of the day being punished. The Welsh Not certainly existed but how widespread it was is uncertain. What is certain is that neither the Welsh Not nor eradicating Welsh from schools were ever official state policies but rather something down to individual teachers. 74 Moreover, such an approach could only work if it operated in a context where other forces reinforced the message and parents also saw English as the language of education and progress. 75 Imagined or otherwise, The historians are busy rewriting history. The history of the United Kingdom has become the 'story of the isles' in deference to devolution and closer union with Europe. The Welsh approach to history is also veering so as to make Nationalism's use of the past has indeed often been exclusive rather than inclusive, not to mention based on myths or a partial understanding of events. But this does not mean that the past should not have a role to play in national identity, assuming national identity is accepted as a legitimate end. As John Tosh has argued, 'In the field of nationalism, the contribution of a responsible public history is not to confirm group loyalties, but to subject them to critical appraisal'. 84 Although nationalists are often afraid of critical appraisal, a nation can come out of such an examination stronger rather than weaker. National histories does not need to encourage a nationalism that is bigoted, superior or violent. Being proud of one's nation does not mean having to be opposed to anyone else's. Deconstructing a nation does not mean denying it exists. If history is taught and told in a fashion that takes into account the past's complexities and pluralities, it can strengthen the cohesion of today's diverse society by pointing to that diversity's long and tangled roots. It can help build a civic national identity based on the here and now, rather than the grievances of yesterday. Understanding the past might also help us understand that nations need not be the only ways to organize societies. As Beverley Southgate has argued, history helps us live with ambiguity. 85 It helps us to accept and work with the complexities of society rather than to complain about and fight them. But whatever the future holds for Wales, it should be based on the needs of that future and not the chains of the past.
